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Picture yourself giving a speech to an 
audience of one hundred people. While you 
speak, every person boos and makes hostile 
comments. You have no support. Would you 
have the strength to persevere against such 
adversity?  
On January 16th, 2004, Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf demonstrated 
such strength. For about forty minutes, he was 
booed and heckled while he tried to update 
the Parliament on the status of Pakistan’s anti-
terrorism movement. His critics primarily 
booed him for supporting the United States’ 
War on Terror. This incident demonstrates 
that people all over the world have either 
extremely negative views or extremely 
positive views of the United States (Bidwai, 
2003; Rohde, 2002; Ross, 2003). Some 
people do not simply disagree with the United 
States rather they despise to an extreme level 
those people who agree with the United States 
(Linville & Edward, 1980; Meindl & Lerner, 
1984). Two assassination attempts on 
President Musharraf presumably demonstrate 
that people despised him because of his 
positive feelings toward the United States.  
 Why and how do people become so 
extreme that they would kill a person who 
disagrees with them? One explanation for this 
extremism is the effect of thought on a 
person’s attitudes. If people believe Arabs 
have less right to the Holy Land than do 
Israelis, then these people might have a 
moderately negative view of Arabs. 
Examining the actions of others (e.g., Arabs) 
and thinking about a situation (e.g., suicide 
bombings) can cause people with initially 
moderate negative views to hold extreme 
negative views (i.e., polarize; Tesser, 1978). 
Merely by thinking, people’s views about 
Arab attacks on Jews may become more 
extreme because the attacks (i.e., negative 
behaviors) reinforce people’s initially 
negative views. The amount of negative 
examples people have to consider influences 
the justification these people have for their 
negative attitudes. Consequently, in many 
instances after thinking, extremists feel 
rightly justified in their attitudes and beliefs. 
Psychologist Abraham Tesser (1978) 
termed the aforementioned phenomenon as 
self-generated attitude change. People’s 
attitudes polarize when given time to think 
(see Tesser, 1978, for a review). That is, if 
people’s original attitudes are positive, then 
after thinking about the object of their 
attitudes, people’s attitudes will become more 
positive. If people’s original attitudes are 
negative, then after thinking about the object 
of their attitudes, people’s attitudes will 
become more negative. The longer people 
think about an issue, the more extreme their 
attitudes may become (Tesser & Conlee, 
1975). 
 
Thought, Beliefs, and Feelings  
Thought is a fluid process that helps 
people change the way they mentally see a 
person, object, event, or issue (Tesser, 1978). 
When people think, they change in a distinct 
way what they believe. During thought, 
people reconstruct their beliefs about a 
person, object, event, or issue to make beliefs 
consistent about that same person, object, 
event, or issue (Tesser, 1978; Tesser & 
Cowan, 1977). During reconstruction, when 
people think about the object of their attitude 
(e.g., person, event, or issue) people create 
new beliefs, reinterpret vague information, 
and reject questionable information. Thus, 
through the reconstruction process, people 
tend to make their beliefs consistent with 
other beliefs (Tesser, 1978; Tesser, Martin,  
& Mendolia, 1995). Individuals, for example, 
may have moderately negative beliefs about 
Palestinians. Thinking about negative 
behaviors attributed to Palestinians (e.g., 
suicide bombings) may lead these individuals 
to hold views that become more extreme 
about all Arabs rather than just Palestinians. 
What people think tends to influence 
not only what they believe but also what they 
feel (McGuire, 1969). That is, what people 
feel about a person, object, event, or issue 
depends in part on what they believe about 
that same person, object, event, or issue. If, 
for example, people do not agree with violent 
attacks on the Holy Land and they generally 
attribute those attacks to Arabs (i.e., belief), 
then they will come to dislike Arabs (i.e., 
affect). 
In sum, through thinking, people make 
their subsequent beliefs consistent with their 
original beliefs. People’s beliefs influence 
their feelings. Consequently, people’s 
thoughts make their beliefs more consistent 
(i.e., less ambivalent), which in turn results in 
their feelings being more consistent (i.e., less 
conflicting). Basically, people’s thoughts lead 
to their attitudes polarizing. 
 
Schemas 
People use their schemas or “naïve 
[theories] of some stimulus domain” to think 
about a person, object, event, or issue (see 
Table 1 for an example; Tesser, 1978, p. 290). 
As people use schemas, people’s beliefs 
become consistent within their schemas. 
When people use schemas during thought, 
people find it easier than when not using 
schemas during thought to focus on relevant 
stimuli, recall relevant information, infer 
absent information, interpret relevant 
information and discount questionable 
information (Tesser, 1978). 
 
 
 
 
Relevant stimuli. People use schemas 
to provide a direction of focus for thinking 
about relevant stimuli (Tesser, 1978). 
Specifically, when people use well-developed 
schemas, people focus their senses (e.g., 
vision, hearing, etc.) on relevant stimuli 
(Tesser, 1978). Tesser and Danheiser (1978) 
found that when participants were informed 
they would be cooperating with their partner, 
participants’ schemas of a cooperative 
relationship helped them focus on positive 
attributes about their partner. When 
Table 1 
 
Example of a possible schema about an Arab 
person 
 
Stimulus Schema 
 
Arab person 
 
dark skinned 
dark hair 
speaks with an accent 
robes 
kaffiyeh (Arab headdress) 
business owner 
Ali Baba 
criminal 
bombings in Israel 
Muslim 
September 11th 
terrorism 
unfriendly people 
don’t like those that are 
different 
participants were informed they would be 
competing with their partner, participants’ 
schemas of a competitive relationship helped 
them focus on negative attributes about their 
partner.  
People tend to notice physical 
attributes associated with their well-
developed schema about a person, object, 
event, or issue. If, for example, people have a 
well-developed schema for suicide bombers 
in Israel, certain physical characteristics 
would get their attention. People might notice 
skin color, hair texture, the sound of a 
person’s voice, the language a person speaks, 
or the clothing a person wears. 
Recall relevant information. People’s 
schemas help them recall relevant information 
about a person, object, event, or issue (Tesser, 
1978). When people try to recall relevant 
information, people’s schemas provide rules 
for how to think about a person, object, event, 
or issue. That is, people tend to recall 
behavior and information consistent with their 
schema rather than behavior and information 
inconsistent with their schema (Tesser, 1978). 
When provided with a description of a 
particular person, such as a job applicant for a 
salesman position, participants recall 
information they know about salesmen 
(Clary, Tesser, & Downing, 1978). 
Participants rated applicants that fit into their 
schema of a salesman higher than those 
applicants that did not fit into their schema of 
a salesman. Following the previous example 
(i.e., suicide bomber), if people focus on 
physical characteristics relevant to a certain 
schema, people will recall information (e.g., 
Muslim) they have about those who commit 
suicide bombings. 
Infer Absent information. People with 
well-developed schemas about a person, 
object, event, or issue are better able than 
people with less-developed schemas to 
generate beliefs consistent with their schema 
(Leone & Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Leone, 
1977). Therefore, when there are holes (i.e., 
deficits) in people’s information, people use 
schemas to help them fill in any missing 
information in their beliefs (Tesser, 1978). 
People, for example, might hear on a news 
broadcast that a person committed a terrorist 
act. However, a newscaster may not provide 
the terrorist’s nationality. People who have a 
well-developed schema about Arabs being 
terrorists would assume that the terrorist in 
the news broadcast is an Arab. 
People can also infer absent 
information through employing substitution. 
Rumelhart and Ortony (1976) found that 
schemas could include both lower and higher 
levels where lower levels have more details 
than do higher levels. Substitute information 
can come from a lower level within an 
accessed higher level schema. However, 
people can also use an activated higher level 
schema to respond without giving all lower 
level details. If, for example, people infer that 
a person is an Arab, they do not need to know 
how they made such an inference. All people 
need to know is their conclusion: that person 
is an Arab. 
Interpret information. During the 
interpretation process, people give meaning to 
events. That is, people decide what 
information means to them and how it relates 
to their schema. If the information is 
inconsistent with an established schema, 
people often reinterpret the information 
making it consistent with an established 
schema (Tesser & Cowan, 1977). When asked 
to evaluate ambiguous adjectives among sets 
of unambiguous adjectives for the likeability 
or dislikeability of an individual, participants 
reinterpreted ambiguous adjectives to make 
them consistent with unambiguous adjectives 
(Tesser & Cowan, 1977). If all unambiguous 
adjectives characterized a likeable person, 
participants reinterpreted ambiguous 
adjectives to make them consistent with the 
likeable adjectives. If all unambiguous 
adjectives represent a dislikeable person, 
participants reinterpreted ambiguous 
adjectives to make them consistent with the 
dislikeable adjectives. When thinking about a 
person who is an Arab, people will attribute to 
that person behaviors and attitudes they 
believe Arabs exhibit. If people believe Arabs 
are unfriendly people, yet they see an Arab 
being friendly to another person, people 
would reinterpret the positive behavior to be 
consistent with their unfriendly Arab schema. 
Therefore, people might conclude that the 
witnessed positive behavior was only an 
attempt to appear to be a good person.  
Discount questionable information. 
People use schemas while performing several 
cognitive processes such as understanding, 
remembering, and thinking (Tesser, 1978). 
During these cognitive processes, people tend 
to discount questionable information (Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When participants 
interviewed other people to determine if 
interviewees were introverted (i.e., shy) or 
extroverted (i.e., outgoing), participants 
tended to ask questions leading in the 
direction of their hypothesis about the person 
being an introvert or extrovert (Fazio, Effrein, 
& Falender, 1981; Snyder & Swann, 1978). In 
addition, participants asked questions about 
their introverted behavior tended to behave in 
a more introverted manner after being 
interviewed than they did before being 
interviewed. Participants asked questions 
about their extroverted behavior tended to 
behave in a more extroverted manner after 
being interviewed than they did before being 
interviewed (Fazio et al., 1981). Asking 
leading questions forced interviewees to 
remember and think about times they behaved 
in an introverted or extroverted manner and 
thus exhibit such behavior.  
When people use a developed schema, 
the more they think about some object or 
event, the more people polarize their feelings. 
Sadler and Tesser (1973) tested this notion by 
having participants describe themselves to 
one another. They found that when partners (a 
recording made by the researcher) 
complimented participants, participants given 
an opportunity for thought evaluated their 
partners more positively as compared to 
participants who were distracted. In numerous 
experiments (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone 
& Ensley, 1985), researchers found that 
attitudes of participants given time to think 
about a person, object, event, or issue, became 
more polarized and more consistent with 
existing schemas than attitudes of participants 
not given time to think. 
 
Moderating Influences  
In order for attitudes to polarize, 
people must think (i.e., engage their schema) 
(Tesser, 1978). Not all forms of thought, 
however, are the same (Spiro, 1975). People 
who engage in a form of thought may or may 
not experience attitude polarization. In 
general, beliefs tend to be evaluatively 
consistent within an existing schema (Tesser, 
1978). However, process and reality 
constraints can limit or reverse attitude 
polarization (Tesser, 1976; 1978; Tesser et al., 
1995). People utilize process constraints when 
examining the origin of a belief for unrealistic 
or faulty support (e.g., Leone & Aronow, 
1992; Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 1978). This 
identification of the root of a belief is a 
process constraint.  
Through close examination of their 
beliefs, people could determine that the root 
of their beliefs is faulty or unrealistic because 
the root does not stand up to scrutiny. People 
could also realize that they made a leap of 
logic and therefore have no logical basis for 
their beliefs (Leone & Aronow, 1992; Tesser 
et al., 1978). If people determine a belief is 
unrealistic or faulty and cannot be supported, 
people have no choice but to dismiss or re-
examine their beliefs. Thus, because people 
would no longer have a valid belief on which 
to base their attitudes, peoples’ attitudes could 
not polarize (see also Leone & Baldwin, 
1983; Leone, Minor, & Baltimore, 1986). 
Individuals believing Arabs are bad, for 
example, can be asked to examine why they 
hold such a belief. During examination, 
individuals may review reasons for their 
beliefs. However, individuals may have only 
one reason: attacks on the Holy Land. Upon 
further examination, those individuals 
examining their beliefs may realize that 
Israelis also commit attacks on the Holy 
Land. Individuals realize that if they believe 
Arabs are bad, they must also believe Israelis 
are bad. 
When people utilize reality 
constraints, they focus on factual information 
or verifiable attributes of a person, object, 
event, or issue (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 
1995). People test their beliefs against an 
actual person, object, event, or issue to ensure 
that what they believe is accurate or factual 
(Festinger, 1954). When people become 
aware of inconsistencies between their beliefs 
about a person, object, event, or issue and 
reality (i.e., factual information or a verifiable 
attribute), these people will have no choice 
but to abandon such beliefs in order to appear 
reasonable and rational (Leone, Taylor, & 
Adams, 1991). As people abandon beliefs 
used to support polarized attitudes, people’s 
polarized attitudes will weaken or depolarize 
(see also Leone & Baldwin, 1983; Leone et 
al., 1986).  
Following a previous example, 
individuals believing Arabs are bad may 
witness an Arab exhibiting a positive 
behavior such as assisting an elderly woman 
crossing a street. The witnessed positive 
behavior may be a reality constraint on the 
extreme beliefs of individuals believing Arabs 
are bad. Individuals’ reality constraints, in 
this case helping an elderly person, will force 
these individuals to acknowledge that their 
extreme beliefs (e.g., Arabs are bad) are 
inconsistent with reality. Through addressing 
such inconsistencies between reality and their 
beliefs, individuals will be forced to abandon 
their extreme views about the Arab they 
witnessed exhibiting a positive behavior and 
possibly abandon their extreme views about 
all Arabs.  
 
Individual Differences 
Individual differences in thinking style 
are related to whether or not people’s thinking 
leads to their attitudes polarizing. Individuals 
with a verbal cognitive style (i.e., they think 
and learn using words) will react to process 
constraints and re-adjust their beliefs because 
finding the origin of a belief requires thought 
through words (Leone & Aronow, 1992). 
Individuals with a visual cognitive style (i.e., 
they think and learn using pictures) will be 
less likely to react to process constraints and 
therefore be less likely to re-adjust their 
beliefs because finding the origin of a belief 
requires thought through words (Leone & 
Aronow, 1992). When given process 
constraints, individuals with a visual 
cognitive style will be more likely than 
individuals with a verbal cognitive style to 
polarize their attitudes, because visual 
individuals are less able to think in the verbal 
style required to reanalyze and reconsider 
beliefs. 
 The extent to which an individual is 
dogmatic also influences attitude polarization. 
Dogmatism refers to the way people think 
about their world (Rokeach, 1954, 1960). 
People who are dogmatic compartmentalize 
beliefs and feelings about a person, object, 
event, or issue (Franklin & Carr, 1971; 
Zagona & Zurcher, 1965). Dogmatic people 
could have many different beliefs about a 
person, object, event, or issue but would 
never integrate inconsistent information (Hunt 
& Miller, 1968; Donehew, Parker & 
McDermott, 1972). People who are non-
dogmatic integrate their beliefs and feelings 
about a person, object, event, or issue 
(Franklin & Carr, 1971; Zagona & Zurcher, 
1965). Non-dogmatic people could have 
many different beliefs about a person, object, 
even, or issue and would integrate 
inconsistent information (Hunt & Miller, 
1968; Donehew, Parker & McDermott, 1972). 
People that do not like Arabs, for example, 
could work closely with Arabs and have a 
positive relationship. Despite a positive 
working relationship, dogmatic people would 
maintain their dislike of Arabs because 
dogmatic people would not integrate a 
positive working relationship with their 
negative view of Arabs. Conversely, non-
dogmatic people may discount their dislike of 
Arabs because non-dogmatic people would 
reassess their negative view of Arabs and 
integrate their experience of a positive 
working relationship.  
 Dogmatic people are more likely than 
non-dogmatic people to hold extreme views 
(Leone, 1989). Dogmatic people 
compartmentalize their beliefs and are 
therefore likely to hold inconsistent beliefs 
about a person, object, event, or issue. During 
thought, dogmatic people would not integrate 
inconsistent information to challenge other 
beliefs. Due to the thinking style of dogmatic 
people, they are likely to experience thought-
induced attitude polarization (Leone, 1989). 
Non-dogmatic people have an integrated set 
of beliefs and thus would analyze and 
reconsider all aspects of a person, object, 
event, or issue. During thought, non-dogmatic 
people are able to recognize that they hold 
inconsistent beliefs. Due to the thinking style 
of non-dogmatic people, they are not likely to 
experience much thought-induced attitude 
polarization (Leone, 1989). 
Another individual difference 
associated with thought-induced attitude 
change is a person’s need for cognition. 
Researchers use the Need for Cognition Scale 
to measure individual differences in the 
tendency to seek out and enjoy effortful 
cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
High need for cognition individuals like to 
think about a variety of issues (including 
social, political, and international). Low need 
for cognition individuals do not like to think 
about such issues. High need for cognition 
individuals are seen as “chronic cognizers,” 
whereas low need for cognition individuals 
are seen as “cognitive misers” (Cacioppo et 
al., 1996, p. 247). High need to for cognition 
individuals generally enjoy thinking even 
when not necessary. High need for cognition 
individuals, for example, would solve 
challenging puzzles for fun. Low need for 
cognition individuals engage in effortful 
thought only when necessary. Low need for 
cognition individuals, for example, would 
solve challenging puzzles only if required. 
The effort of high need for cognition 
individuals and the lack of effort of low need 
for cognition individuals does not, however, 
reflect their level of intelligence (see 
Cacioppo et al., 1996, for a review).  
As opposed to low need for cognition 
individuals, high need for cognition 
individuals tend to be more knowledgeable 
about a variety of social issues (see Cacioppo 
et al., 1996, for a review). Compared to low 
need for cognition individuals, high need for 
cognition individuals tend to analyze their 
beliefs and consider both sides of an issue 
(i.e., both pros and cons) and thus formulate 
complex schemas (Fletcher, Danilovics, 
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Due to 
their analysis and reanalysis, high need for 
cognition individuals experience more 
difficulty than do low need for cognition 
individuals in reaching a conclusive decision 
about an issue (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; 
Priester & Petty, 1995). Also, if high need for 
cognition individuals perceive a bias, they are 
more likely than low need for cognition 
individuals to make a cognitive effort to 
compensate for their bias (D’Agostino & 
Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Petty & Jarvis, 1996; 
Petty & Wegener, 1993).  
Unlike low need for cognition 
individuals, high need for cognition 
individuals also analyze arguments presented 
by others (Smith & Petty, 1996). Due to their 
analysis, high need for cognition individuals 
are less likely than low need for cognition 
individuals to change their attitude 
immediately after a persuasive argument (see 
Cacioppo et al., 1996, for a review). During 
their analysis, high need for cognition 
individuals employ their complex schemas to 
develop counter arguments. After full 
consideration (which may take minutes, 
hours, days or weeks), high need for cognition 
individuals will make a decision about the 
argument. If high need for cognition 
individuals believe a speaker presented a 
strong argument, they will change their 
attitude. High need for cognition individuals 
will not be persuaded if they believe a speaker 
presented a weak argument and they will 
dismiss a speakers’ argument because the 
argument did not withstand scrutiny. In 
contrast, low need for cognition individuals 
do not employ their complex schemas to 
develop counter arguments. Low need for 
cognition individuals will make a decision 
about the argument quickly. If low need for 
cognition individuals were exposed to a 
speaker who presented a strong argument, 
they will change their attitude but not because 
they evaluated the argument. Low need for 
cognition individuals will not be persuaded if 
they believe a speaker presented a weak 
argument, however, because they do not exert 
the cognitive energy to fully consider the 
merits of the argument they will likely change 
their attitude. Low need for cognition 
individuals are more easily influenced than 
high need for cognition individuals by 
superficial aspects such as the appearance of a 
message (e.g., a colorful commercial), person 
speaking (e.g., a celebrity or popularity), 
expertise of a speaker (e.g., doctor or 
layperson), or the number of arguments (e.g., 
five instead of two) presented (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1983; Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
Situations such as high personal 
relevance do arise where both high and low 
need for cognition individuals pay close 
attention and carefully scrutinize information 
(Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987). There are 
also situations such as low personal relevance 
where both high and low need for cognition 
individuals conserve cognitive effort (Axsom 
et al., 1987). When a speaker’s message is 
low in personal relevance, an audiences’ 
reaction during a presentation influences 
attitudes of participants low in need for 
cognition because low need for cognition 
individuals do not enjoy cognitive effort 
(Axsom et al., 1987). An audiences’ reaction 
does not influence attitudes of participants 
high in need for cognition as opposed to 
attitudes of participants low in need for 
cognition, because high need for cognition 
individuals enjoy cognitive effort. When a 
speaker’s message is high in personal 
relevance, however, audience reaction does 
not affect participants low in need for 
cognition or participants high in need for 
cognition (Axsom et al., 1987). That is, when 
a situation is important, high and low need for 
cognition individuals are attentive.  
People’s need for cognition also 
affects attitude polarization (Leone, 1994; 
Leone & Ensley, 1986). Specifically, low 
need for cognition individuals, as compared to 
high need for cognition individuals, find less 
difficulty in generating consistent beliefs as 
the opportunity for thought increases (Leone, 
1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986). As the 
generation of consistent beliefs increases so 
too does attitude polarization. When low need 
for cognition individuals analyze their beliefs, 
they discount inconsistent beliefs (Leone, 
1994). Low need for cognition individuals do 
not access multiple schemas for analysis 
because these individuals likely do not have 
multiple schemas developed. If they do have 
multiple schemas, low need for cognition 
individuals do not want to exert the cognitive 
effort necessary to access them. When high 
need for cognition individuals analyze their 
beliefs, they add new information to their 
established beliefs. High need for cognition 
individuals will access multiple schemas for 
analysis. High need for cognition individuals 
typically have multiple schemas developed 
for a variety of issues. High need for 
cognition individuals will exert the cognitive 
effort necessary to access their schemas.  
Thus, high need for cognition individuals 
have a more difficult time than do low need 
for cognition individuals in generating 
consistent beliefs about some stimuli (Leone, 
1994). Therefore, high need for cognition 
individuals are less susceptible than low need 
for cognition individuals to attitude 
polarization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitude Structure 
People derive a specific attitude about 
an issue from a broad attitude about the same 
or similar issue (Chaiken & Yates, 1985; 
Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). People who have a 
negative attitude about foreigners, for 
example, are more likely than people who 
have a positive attitude about foreigners to 
believe that foreigners are terrorists. People 
also tend to unknowingly structure their 
attitudes in a top-down hierarchy in which 
 
 
general attitude (e.g., foreigners are bad) is 
closer to the top and a specific attitude (e.g., 
War on Terror) is closer to the bottom 
(Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). Attitudes at the 
top of a hierarchy are more readily available 
than attitudes at the bottom of a hierarchy 
(Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). People’s general 
attitudes tend to lay a foundation for many 
other attitudes, beliefs, and values on related 
issues (see Table 3; Feather, 1996).  
 
Table 2 
 Summary of High Need for Cognition Individuals and Low Need for Cognition 
Individuals 
 
High Need for Cognition Individuals Low Need for Cognition Individuals 
 
Enjoy cognitive effort. 
 
Do not like to exert cognitive effort. 
 
More knowledgeable about a variety of  
social issues. 
 
Less knowledgeable about a variety of  
social issues. 
 
Have difficulty reaching a conclusive  
decision because they like to analyze their 
beliefs. 
 
Do not have difficulty reaching a decision 
because they follow a readily available  
schema. 
 
Likely to correct judgment bias. 
 
Not likely to correct judgment bias. 
 
Not likely to change their attitude  
immediately after a persuasive argument. 
 
Likely to change their attitudes  
immediately after a persuasive argument. 
 
When the argument is not important, will  
pay attention. 
 
When the argument is important, will pay  
attention. 
 
When the argument is not important, will  
not pay attention. 
 
When the argument is important, will pay  
attention. 
 
Low opportunity for thought: less  
susceptible to attitude polarization; less  
likely to depolarize. 
 
High opportunity for thought: susceptible  
to some attitude polarization; likely to  
depolarization. 
 
Low opportunity for thought: susceptible to 
attitude polarization; not likely to  
depolarize. 
 
High opportunity for thought: susceptible   
attitude polarization; not likely to  
depolarize. 
 
Researchers also link attitudes to ideologies 
(Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Kinder & Sears, 
1985). Ideologies include a wide variety of 
schemas in which these schemas are in a 
hierarchical structure. That is, an ideology 
(i.e., general attitude) is at the top and a 
schema (i.e., intermediate or specific attitude) 
is at the intermediate level or the bottom. 
Basically, ideologies are a set of beliefs about 
interrelated issues and schemas are a set of 
beliefs about one particular issue. Following 
the previous example about foreigners, 
people’s attitude that foreigners are terrorists 
could be a schema, and this schema could be 
categorized under an ideology of foreigners 
are bad. 
When people have such an attitude 
structure (i.e., specific attitudes derived from 
general attitudes), people find difficulty in 
changing a specific attitude (Eagley & 
Chaiken, 1998). Given a complex ideology 
and schema structure from which people 
derive values for multiple issues, people 
might have difficulty changing an attitude 
because such a process could require a great 
deal of effort. That is, people might need to 
analyze and reanalyze several specific 
attitudes to change one general attitude. 
Following figure one, people might need to 
analyze their attitudes and beliefs about issues 
one (i.e., foreigners are terrorists), two (i.e., 
foreigners can’t be trusted) and three (i.e., 
conservative on immigration) to affect their 
attitude about a value (i.e., foreigners are 
bad). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because low need for cognition 
individuals do not like to exert mental effort 
and tend to have less complex ideology and 
schema structures than do high need for 
cognition individuals (Cacioppo et al., 1996), 
low need for cognition individuals will be 
more likely than high need for cognition 
individuals to change an attitude about a 
specific issue (Leone, 1994). Also, because 
low need for cognition individuals have less 
complex ideology than do high need for 
cognition individuals, attitudes of low need 
for cognition individuals are weaker and will 
be less constant (i.e., predictable) over a 
period of time (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). 
Low need for cognition individuals’ possess a 
small repository of information and 
arguments that provide a weak basis for their 
attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1986) thereby 
allowing low need for cognition individuals to 
experience greater attitude polarization than 
high need for cognition individuals (see figure 
2). High need for cognition individuals enjoy 
exerting mental effort and tend to have more 
complex ideology and schema structures than 
do low need for cognition individuals (Leone, 
1994), and thus high need for cognition 
Table 3.  
Hierarchical attitude structure (top to bottom)
 
General Value (e.g., foreigners are bad) 
 
Intermediate (e.g., foreigners are terrorists) 
 
Specific Attitude (e.g., War on Terror, against 
 
liberal policy on immigration, etc.) 
 
Figure 1. Ideology and Schema Relationship
Ideology 
Schema 
Key 
Value: 
foreigners 
are bad 
Issue 1: 
foreigners 
are 
terrorists 
Issue 2: 
foreigners 
can’t be 
trusted 
Issue 3: 
conservative 
on 
immigration  
individuals will be less likely than low need 
for cognition individuals to change an attitude 
about a specific issue. Also, because high 
need for cognition individuals have a more 
complex ideology than do low need for 
cognition individuals’, high need for 
cognition individuals’ attitudes are stronger 
and will be more constant (i.e., predictable) 
over a period of time (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
That is, high need for cognition individuals’ 
possess a large repository of information and 
arguments that provide a strong basis for their 
developed attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1986) 
thereby allowing high need for cognition 
individuals to be more resistant than low need 
for cognition individuals to attitude 
polarization (see figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary and Hypothesis 
 When people use schemas, some 
beliefs become salient (i.e., prominent). In 
addition, people’s schemas give people rules 
for thought. Through use of schemas, 
people’s beliefs tend to become evaluatively 
consistent. Also, when people follow a 
schema salient cognitions can change. Thus, 
if people’s beliefs become evaluatively 
consistent, then the more people think, the 
more their feelings (i.e., attitudes) should 
polarize. 
Following previous theory and 
research (Leone, & Ensley, 1985; Tesser, 
1978), it is predicted that the amount of time  
 
given for thought (i.e., longer opportunity for 
thought) will influence the amount of attitude 
polarization. Additionally, individual 
differences in need for cognition affect the 
extent to which attitudes will polarize. It is 
predicted that when given a longer 
opportunity for thought, attitudes of low need 
for cognition individuals will polarize, 
whereas attitudes of high need for cognition 
individuals will depolarize. Finally, when 
considering theory on ideologies (Kinder & 
Sears, 1985), if the effect of opportunity for 
thought is limited to the issue considered, 
then attitudes about all other issues, for both 
high and low need for cognition individuals, 
Figure 2. Low need for cognition versus high need for cognition attitude structure. 
Attitude 
Argument 1 Argument 2 
Argument 3 Argument 4 
Attitude 
Argument 1 
Argument 1 
Argument 1 
Argument 1 
Argument 1 Argument 1 
Argument 1 
Argument 1 
Attitude Support for Low Need for Cognition 
Individual 
Attitude Support for High Need for 
Cognition Individual 
will not polarize. If, however, the effects of 
opportunity for thought do generalize, it is 
predicted that attitudes of low need for 
cognition individuals will become extreme 
even about issues they did not specifically 
consider. It is predicted that attitudes of high 
need for cognition individuals will depolarize 
about issues they did not specifically 
consider. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 The experimenter recruited 153 
university students using the Psychology 
Department participant pool. Participants 
volunteered for a study on “Individual 
Differences in Views on International and 
Athletic Issues.” Participants received extra-
credit. Participation was voluntary as students 
could earn extra-credit by other means.  
Participants were predominantly 
White, (n = 93) enrolled in undergraduate 
psychology courses. The remainder of 
participants reported that their racial 
backgrounds were Asian (n = 15), Black (n = 
27), Latino (n = 13), or Other (n = 5). Efforts 
were not made to recruit an equal number of 
female (123) and male (30) participants. 
Participants reported their ages in terms of 
age ranges: between 18 and 22, 22.2% (n = 
34); between 23 and 27, 4.6% (n = 7); 
between 28 and 32, 3.9% (n = 6); between 33 
and 37, 7.2% (n = 11); 38 and older. 
Participants’ ages were atypical of traditional 
university students because the university is a 
commuter school (i.e., most students live off 
campus) with an older, non-traditional 
population (Sears, 1996). 
Several (n = 7) participants did not 
respond to one statement on their 
questionnaire. Data from three participants 
were excluded because they left several 
statements unanswered. A female 
experimenter randomly assigned participants 
to an experimental condition before this study 
began. She obtained informed consent in 
writing from all participants and treated them 
in accordance with APA standards (American 
Psychological Association, 1992). At the end 
of the study, she debriefed every participant. 
She obtained Institutional Review Board 
approval before collecting any data. 
 
Procedure 
 A female experimenter greeted 
individual participants as they entered a room 
and briefly explained the purpose of the 
experiment (i.e., to learn about individual 
differences in students’ attitudes on a variety 
of international and athletic issues). She 
informed participants that their responses are 
confidential. Then she advised participants 
that because participation was voluntary, they 
could withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty. Participants had an 
opportunity to ask questions to ensure they 
were adequately informed. Participants then 
signed an informed consent form.  
 The first part of the procedure 
involved an interview similar to the procedure 
used by Leone (1989). A female experimenter 
showed participants a 15-point scale with 
endpoints labeled as strongly agree (+ 7), 
neutral (0), and strongly disagree (– 7). 
Intermediate points were also labeled; + 4 was 
labeled as moderately agree and – 4 was 
labeled as moderately disagree. She explained 
this scale to each participant. Then she 
provided an example of a statement (i.e., 
Alligators should be removed from ponds 
adjacent to houses) similar to statements 
participants would read. She then 
demonstrated to participants the manner in 
which to respond to a statement to indicate 
their attitude (e.g., + 7 if they strongly agreed 
or – 7 if they strongly disagreed). To ensure 
participants clearly understood how to use the 
scale to indicate their attitude, she provided 
another example (i.e., Every street should 
have a crossing guard to assist children) and 
asked participants to respond out loud with 
the number closest to their attitude. She then 
gave each participant the scale to use during 
the first part of the procedure and participants 
were given an opportunity to ask questions. 
 After providing an explanation of the 
scale, she presented seventy statements to 
participants: thirty-five statements about 
international issues and thirty-five statements 
about athletic issues. She presented 
participants with one statement at a time. 
Statements about international issues were 
presented before statements about athletic 
issues. Each statement was typed on a 5” by 
8” note card to allow for easy randomization 
of statement order within each category (i.e., 
international or athletic). Each note card 
contained one statement regarding an 
international issue (e.g., There should be 
stricter laws against international computer 
crime) or an athletic issue (e.g., College 
athletes should be paid). Participants had 
approximately 10 seconds to verbally respond 
to each statement. A written number on the 
back of each note card to allowed for easy 
recording of participant responses. She 
recorded participant responses on a coding 
sheet to which participants had no access and 
thus could not compare later responses to 
current responses. 
Once participants responded to each 
statement, she informed them that she was 
especially interested in their thoughts about 
several issues in particular. Participants were 
then told they would be asked to think about 
several selected issues. She selected two 
statements concerning international issues to 
which participants responded with a 
moderately agree response (i.e., + 4) and two 
statements regarding international issues to 
which participants responded with a 
moderately disagree response (i.e., – 4). If a 
participant did not respond with a moderately 
agree or moderately disagree to any 
statements, then she selected the next closest 
response (i.e., +3 or –3). Once she selected 
four issues, she read out loud one of the four 
issues to each participant and allowed the 
participant to read the issue as well. 
Participants did not have access to the 15-
point scale while they thought about the 
issues. Similar to Leone’s (1989) experiment, 
she informed participants that 
I just had you rate the issues based on how 
you currently feel. Now I would like you 
to gather your thoughts about several 
issues in particular. I will give you one 
issue at a time. Concentrate all your 
thoughts on the issue during the time I 
give you. You might want to think about 
how you feel about the issue. You might 
want to think about important facts related 
to the issue. Or you might want to think 
about your own personal beliefs about the 
issue. Just think about the issue and 
continue to think about it until I tell you to 
stop. Please think about [the experimenter 
read out loud one of the issues previously 
selected] (p. 1245). 
 
Before the experiment began, she randomly 
assigned participants to one of two 
opportunities for thought: to think about the 
issue for either 30 or 90 seconds (Leone, 
1989). She counterbalanced the issue order 
(i.e., positive vs. negative) within opportunity 
for thought times (i.e., 30 or 90 seconds). 
However, the assigned time was used for 
every issue. 
 Once opportunity for thought ended, 
the experimenter told participants (Leone, 
1989) 
Now that you’ve had a chance to collect 
your thoughts, I’d like you to once again 
indicate how you feel. Sometimes 
people’s feelings change even over a short 
a period of time as this. Of course, you 
may or may not feel the same way about 
the issue. Using the scale in front of you, 
just indicate how you now feel about [the 
experimenter reiterated the issue] (p. 
1245). 
She showed participants the 15-point scale 
and recorded their responses on a coding 
sheet to which participants had no access. She 
repeated the above procedure for the three 
remaining statements. 
 To assess issue-specific attitude 
polarization, participant “pre-test” (i.e., before 
given opportunity for thought) responses are 
compared to participant “post-test” (i.e., after 
given opportunity for thought) responses for 
each of the four issues. If a participant’s 
initial attitude strengthened, the response was 
assigned a score of “1” (e.g., if a participant’s 
initial attitude changed from a + 4 to a + 6 or 
a – 4 to a – 7, then the response was assigned 
a “1”). If a participant’s initial attitude 
weakened, the response was assigned a score 
of “-1” (e.g., if a participant’s initial attitude 
change from a + 4 to a + 2 or a – 4 to a – 1, 
then the response was assigned a “-1”). If a 
participant’s attitude remained the same, the 
response was assigned a score of “0” (e.g., if 
a participants attitude remains at + 4 or – 4, 
then the response was assigned a “0”). Once 
scores were assigned to each individual 
statement, the scores for all four issues were 
summed.  
Once participants re-rated their 
attitude on the selected four issues, she told 
participants: 
Now, I’d like you to take another look at 
all the statements. I will follow the same 
procedure as before. I will give you the 
note card and I would like you to once 
again respond out loud with the number 
closest to your attitude about the issue 
now. Go with your gut reaction. You 
might feel the same way or you might not. 
It is okay either way. Just go with your 
gut reaction. 
As in the first portion of the experiment, she 
recorded participant’s responses on a coding 
sheet to which participants had no access. 
Two different methods were used to 
assess participants overall attitude 
polarization. In the first method, participant’s 
“pre-test” (i.e., before given opportunity for 
thought) response was compared to their 
“post-test” (i.e., after given opportunity for 
thought) response for each of the thirty issues. 
If a participant’s initial attitude strengthened, 
the response was assigned a score of “1”. If a 
participant’s initial attitude weakened, the 
response was assigned a score of “-1”. If a 
participant’s attitude remained the same, the 
response was assigned a score of “0”. Once a 
score was assigned to each individual 
statement, response scores for the 
international and athletic issues were summed 
separately. 
In the second method, the focus was 
on the extremity of overall attitude 
polarization. For each “pre-test” and “post-
test” statement for international and athletic 
issues, a score was derived through assessing 
the absolute value of each response. That is, if 
a participant’s response to a statement was 
“+5”, then the score for the statement was 
“5”. If a participant’s response to a statement 
was “–5”, then the score for the statement was 
“5”. Once a score was assigned to each 
statement, response scores for the “pre-test” 
international issues, “pre-test” athletic issues, 
“post-test” international issues and “post-test” 
athletic issues were summed separately.  
Following the completion of the 
interview, participants completed the 18-item 
Need for Cognition Scale to measure 
individual differences in the tendency to seek 
out and enjoy effortful cognitive activities 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Participants’ 
evaluated each statement as being 
characteristic of themselves on a scale of 1 to 
5 (i.e., 1: extremely uncharacteristic; 2: 
somewhat uncharacteristic, 3: uncertain; 4: 
somewhat characteristic; 5: extremely 
characteristic). Nine statements on the Need 
for Cognition Scale are positively worded 
(e.g., “I only think as hard as I have to”) such 
that agreement is indicative of a low need for 
cognition; nine statements on the Need for 
Cognition Scale are negatively worded (e.g., 
“I usually end up deliberating about issues 
even when they do not affect me personally”) 
such that agreement is indicative of a high 
need for cognition. 
Responses to all individual statements 
were scored such that a higher score is 
indicative of a higher need for cognition. For 
statements where participants left an item 
unanswered, the mean for the response of the 
entire sample was used. Once scores were 
assigned to the individual responses, a total 
score for each participant was obtained via 
summation of scores for individual responses. 
High scores indicate a high need for cognition 
(i.e., participant likes to engage in effortful 
thought), whereas low scores indicate a low 
need for cognition (i.e., participant does not 
like to engage in effortful thought). A median 
split of the entire range of scores on the Need 
for Cognition Scale was used to categorize 
participants as high or low in the need for 
cognition. 
Researchers found that Need for 
Cognition Scale scores are reliable. Many 
researchers found Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from .81 to .97 (e.g., Cacioppo, et al., 1984; 
Peltier & Schibrowky, 1994; Sadowski, 1993; 
Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992b; Spotts, 1994). In 
this study, a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .89 was 
obtained for scores on the Need for Cognition 
Scale. Researchers also assessed test-retest 
reliability with for Need for Cognition Scale 
scores. Over a seven-week period, Sadowski 
and Gulgoz (1992) found a test-retest 
correlation of .88 (p < .01).  
In addition, researchers found the 
Need for Cognition Scale scores to have 
discriminant validity. In measuring 
dogmatism, for example, researchers found 
only a weak negative correlation with the 
need for cognition scores (r = -.23, p < .05, 
Cacioppo & Petty (1982), study 3 & 4). As 
expected, researchers also found the Need for 
Cognition Scale scores to be negatively, but 
weakly, related to intolerance of ambiguity (r 
= -.31, ns, Petty & Jarvis, 1996) and openness 
to new ideas (meta-analysis rave = -.34, p < 
.01, Petty & Jarvis, 1996). Furthermore, 
researchers found that Need for Cognition 
Scale scores do not significantly relate to test 
anxiety (r = .02, ns, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
and social desirability (meta-analysis rave = 
.14, p < .01, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Petty & 
Jarvis, 1996). 
Additionally, researchers found the 
Need for Cognition Scale scores to have 
convergent validity. As would be expected, 
researchers also found that Need for 
Cognition Scale scores positively relate to the 
generation of attributes for peoples behavior 
(r = .36, p < .001, Fletcher, Danilovics, 
Fernandez, Peterson, & Redder, 1986; r = .51, 
p < .01, Petty & Jarvis, 1996), the desire to 
think (r = .40, p < .05, Venkatraman, Marlino, 
Kardes, & Sklar, 1990a), and the desire to 
evaluate (r = .35, p < .05, Jarvis & Petty, 
1996).  
Participants’ sex, age, and race were 
also assessed through a series of demographic 
questions. Participants were asked their sex. 
Response options included male and female. 
Participants were asked about their age. 
Response options included 18 – 22, 23 – 27, 
28 – 32, 33 – 37, or 38 and older. Participants 
were asked their race. Response options 
included Asian, Black / African-American, 
Caucasian / White, Latino / Hispanic, or 
Other. 
Results 
 
Overview of Design and Analysis 
This study was a 2 (low vs. high 
opportunity for thought) by 2 (low vs. high 
need for cognition) factorial design. The 
dependent variables of interest in this study 
were issue-specific attitude polarization and 
overall attitude polarization. Participant 
scores on issue-specific attitude polarization 
and overall attitude polarization were 
analyzed using a 2 (opportunity for thought) 
by 2 (need for cognition) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  
 
Main Analyses 
Issue-Specific Attitude Polarization. It 
was hypothesized that the longer participants 
thought (i.e., high opportunity for thought) 
about a particular issue, the more their 
attitudes would become polarized on that 
issue. Additionally, it was hypothesized that 
people’s need for cognition would be related 
to the extent to which people’s attitudes 
would become polarized. That is, given a high 
opportunity for thought, low need for 
cognition people’s attitudes would become 
polarized but high need for cognition people’s 
attitudes would become depolarized. If these 
hypotheses were supported, a two-way 
interaction between opportunity for thought 
and need for cognition would be expected.  
Contrary to these hypotheses, people 
with a longer opportunity for thought did not 
experience more attitude polarization (M = 
0.22, SD = 1.96) than did people with a 
shorter opportunity for thought (M = -0.22, 
SD = 1.89). There was no statistically 
significant difference in attitude polarization 
between levels of opportunity for thought 
(i.e., 30 sec. vs. 90 sec.). That is, there was no 
main effect of opportunity for thought on 
issue-specific attitude polarization, F (1, 149) 
= 1.73, p > .20. 
As expected, whether or not people’s 
attitudes became polarized depended on 
people’s need for cognition and opportunity 
for thought about an issue. That is, there was 
a statistically significant interaction between 
opportunity for thought and need for 
cognition on issue-specific attitude 
polarization, F (1, 149) = 8.02, p < 0.01. 
People’s attitude change, however, was not in 
the direction expected (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Mean attitude change as a function of opportunity for thought and need for cognition. 
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Individuals low in need for cognition 
experienced more attitude polarization given a 
low opportunity for thought (M = 0.41, SD = 
1.79) than individuals low in need for 
cognition given a high opportunity for 
thought (M = -0.06, SD = 1.85). Individuals 
high in need for cognition experienced more 
attitude polarization given a high opportunity 
for thought  (M = 0.46, SD = 2.05) than 
individuals high in need for cognition given a 
low opportunity for thought (M = -0.88, SD = 
1.81). In short, there was no empirical support 
for this hypothesis. That is, given a high 
opportunity for thought, low need for 
cognition people’s attitudes did not become 
polarized and high need for cognition 
people’s attitudes did not become 
depolarized. 
Overall Attitude Polarization. If the 
effects of opportunity for thought are limited 
to the issue being considered (e.g., a specific 
international issue), then people’s attitudes 
about related issues they did not specifically 
consider (e.g., all other international issues) 
should not become polarized. If people 
consider four international issues out of 35 
international issues, for example, then 
people’s attitudes about the remaining 31 
international issues they did not specifically 
consider should not become polarized. If, 
however, the effects of opportunity for 
thought do generalize, then people’s attitudes 
about related issues they did not specifically 
consider should also become polarized 
whereas their attitudes about non-related 
issues (e.g., athletic issues) should not be 
affected. If people consider four international 
issues out 35 international issues and 35 
athletic issues, for example, then people’s 
attitudes about the remaining 31 international 
issues they did not specifically consider 
should become polarized whereas their 
attitudes about the 35 athletic issues should 
not be affected. Moreover, if people’s 
attitudes about related issues polarize, then 
overall attitude polarization should be related 
in part to people’s need for cognition. During 
high opportunity for thought, low need for 
cognition people should be more likely than 
high need for cognition people to experience 
more overall attitude polarization. In contrast, 
during low opportunity for thought, both low 
and high need for cognition people should not 
experience overall attitude polarization.  
If these hypotheses were supported, 
there should be a four-way interaction 
between opportunity for thought (low vs. 
high), need for cognition (low vs. high), type 
of issue (international vs. athletic), and time 
of assessment (pre-thought vs. post-thought). 
To evaluate these hypotheses, a 2 (low vs. 
high opportunity for thought) x 2 (low vs. 
high need for cognition) x 2 (international vs. 
athletic issues ratings) x 2 (pre-thought vs. 
post-thought ratings) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last two factors was 
conducted on participants’ overall attitude 
polarization. Contrary to expectations, effects 
of opportunity for thought did not generalize 
more for low need for cognition people than 
for high need for cognition people. 
Additionally, effects of opportunity for 
thought did not generalize more for related 
issues than for non-related issues. In short, the 
four-way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, need for cognition, type of issue, and 
time of assessment did not occur as predicted, 
F < 1.00. 
Although not predicted, there was a 
main effect for type of issue (i.e., 
international vs. athletic issues). In general, 
people experienced more attitude polarization 
about athletic issues (M = 317.08, SD = 
60.36) than they experienced about 
international issues (M = 259.87, SD = 59.98), 
F (1, 149) = 228.60, p < .01. There was also a 
main effect for time of assessment (i.e., pre-
thought or post-thought). In general, people 
experienced more polarized attitudes post-
thought (M = 291.12, SD = 58.93) than they 
did pre-thought (M = 285.84, SD = 54.81) 
regardless of the type of issue considered, F 
(1, 149) = 6.57, p < .01. In short, people’s 
attitudes were more polarized about athletic 
issues than international issues and people’s 
attitudes were more polarized about both 
issues (athletic and international) post-
thought. 
Secondary Analysis 
After conducting the main analysis, a 
series of secondary analyses using (a) 
participant’s self-reported athletic television 
viewing and (b) participant’s self-reported 
news television viewing were conducted. 
Specifically, we conducted a series of chi-
square analyses using participants’ individual 
differences in need for cognition and 
responses to questions about television 
viewing. Participant responses to athletic 
viewing questions were assessed first. There 
was no relationship between participants’ 
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale and 
how frequently participants reported watching 
athletics on television. High and low need for 
cognition individuals did not significantly 
differ in how frequently they watched 
athletics on television in general, χ2 (3, N = 
153) = 2.91,   p > .05. There was also no 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and their 
response to how frequently they watched 
athletics on particular networks. That is, high 
and low need for cognition individuals did not 
significantly differ in how frequently they 
watched athletics on CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX, 
or TNT (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Chi-Square Results for Frequency of Athletic 
Television Viewing 
News Station Chi-square 
CBS χ2 = 1.53, p > .05  
ABC χ2 = 4.02, p > .05 
NBC χ2 = 4.66, p > .05 
FOX χ2 = 5.21, p > .05 
TNT χ2 = 5.17, p > .05 
(Note: for all analyses, N = 153). 
 
 
 
There was, however, a significant 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and their 
response to how frequently they watched 
athletics on ESPN, χ2 (2, N = 153) = 6.63, p < 
.05. When asked whether they watched 
ESPN, high need for cognition individuals 
responded ‘yes’ (41.38%) less frequently than 
did low need for cognition individuals 
(58.62%). High need for cognition individuals 
also responded ‘no’ (48.65%) less frequently 
than did low need for cognition individuals 
(51.35%). But high need for cognition 
individuals responded ‘not applicable’ 
(68.97%) more frequently than did low need 
for cognition individuals (31.03%). That is, 
high need for cognition individuals were less 
likely than low need for cognition individuals 
to watch athletics on ESPN. 
There was also a significant 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and participants 
overall athletic television station preference,              
χ2 (4, N = 153) = 10.11, p < .05. Low need for 
cognition individuals (51.63%) preferred to 
watch CBS, ABC, and NBC more frequently 
than did high need for cognition individuals 
(42.86%). Low need for cognition individuals 
(72.22%) also preferred to watch FOX more 
frequently than did high need for cognition 
individuals (27.78%). High need for cognition 
individuals, however, preferred to watch TNT 
(88.89%) more frequently than did low need 
for cognition individuals (11.11%). High need 
for cognition individuals also preferred to 
watch ESPN (53.85%) more frequently than 
did low need for cognition individuals 
(46.15%). Finally, low need for cognition 
individuals selected the ‘not applicable’ 
option (53.33%) more frequently than did 
high need for cognition individuals (46.67%). 
Participant responses to news viewing 
statements were also assessed. There was no 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and 
participants’ responses to how frequently they 
watched news on particular networks. That is, 
high and low need for cognition individuals 
did not significantly differ in how frequently 
they watched news on CBS, CNN, FOX, or 
PBS (see Table 5). 
 
(Note: for all analyses, N = 153) 
 
There was, however, a significant 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and their 
response to watching news on NBC, χ2 (2, N 
= 153) = 8.06, p < .05. When asked whether 
they watched news on NBC, low need for 
cognition individuals responded ‘yes’ 
(58.72%) more frequently than did high need 
for cognition individuals (41.28%). High need 
for cognition individuals, however, responded 
‘no’ (67.50%) more frequently than did low 
need for cognition individuals (32.50%). Both 
high and low need for cognition individuals 
responded ‘not applicable’ with the same 
frequency (50.0%). That is, low need for 
cognition individuals watched news on NBC 
more frequently than did high need for 
cognition individuals. 
There was also a significant 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and their 
response to watching news on ABC, χ2 (2, N 
= 153) = 14.50, p < .01. When asked whether 
they watched news on ABC, low need for 
cognition individuals responded ‘yes’ 
(65.43%) or ‘not applicable’ (57.14%) more 
frequently than did high need for cognition 
individuals (34.57%, 42.86% respectively). 
High need for cognition individuals, however, 
responded ‘no’ (66.15%) more frequently 
than did low need for cognition individuals 
(33.85%). That is, low need for cognition 
individuals watched news on ABC more 
Table 5 
Chi-square Results for Frequency of News 
Television Viewing 
News Station Chi-square 
CBS χ2 = 1.36, p > .05  
CNN χ2 = .04, p > .05 
FOX χ2 = 1.65, p > .05 
PBS χ2 = 1.79, p > .05 
frequently than did high need for cognition 
individuals. 
Additionally, there was a significant 
relationship between participants’ scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale and how 
frequently participants watched news on 
television in general, χ2 (4, N = 153) = 10.23, 
p < .05. High need for cognition individuals 
reported watching news 7 days a week 
(57.14%) more frequently than did low need 
for cognition individuals (42.86%). However, 
low need for cognition individuals reported 
watching news 5 days a week (58.82%) or 3 
days a week (68.29%) more frequently than 
did high need for cognition individuals 
(41.18%, 31.71% respectively). High need for 
cognition individuals reported watching news 
1 day a week (62.07%) or ‘not applicable’ 
(71.43%) more frequently than did low need 
for cognition individuals (37.93%, 28.57% 
respectively). 
There was no significant relationship 
between participants’ scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale and participants overall news 
station preference, χ2 (3, N = 153) = 4.88, p > 
.05. That is, low and high need for cognition 
individuals did not prefer to watch a particular 
news station (e.g., FOX) more or less than 
they preferred to watch a different news 
station (e.g., CNN). 
 
Discussion 
 
People’s thoughts affect their 
attitudes. Typically, given an opportunity for 
thought, people’s attitudes polarize (Tesser, 
1978; Tesser et al., 1995). Amount of 
opportunity for thought is related to the extent 
of people’s attitude polarization (Tesser & 
Paulus, 1976). Individual differences, such as 
their need for cognition, are related to the 
amount of people’s attitude polarization 
(Leone, 1989; 1994; 1996; Leone et al., 1991; 
Leone & Ensley, 1986).  
The first purpose of the current 
research was to replicate previous research on 
self-generated attitude change. It was 
hypothesized that individuals given a longer 
opportunity for thought would experience 
more attitude polarization than would 
individuals given a shorter opportunity for 
thought. Although several researchers 
previously replicated the self-generated 
attitude change phenomenon (e.g., Leone & 
Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser 
& Leone, 1977), the findings in this current 
study failed to support this phenomenon.  
The second purpose of the current 
research was to replicate the relationship 
between people’s need for cognition and self-
generated attitude change. People’s need for 
cognition is their tendency to engage in and 
enjoy effortful thought (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996). It was 
hypothesized that given a longer opportunity 
for thought, attitudes of low need for 
cognition individuals would polarize whereas 
attitudes of high need for cognition 
individuals would depolarize. Although 
several researchers previously replicated this 
relationship between people’s need for 
cognition and self-generated attitude change 
(e.g., Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986), 
the findings in this current study failed to 
support this relationship. 
The last purpose of the current 
research was to extend the research on self-
generated attitude change to include 
ideologies. People’s ideologies consist of a 
variety of attitudes about interrelated issues 
(Kinder & Sears, 1985). People’s attitudes 
about athletic issues and international issues, 
for example, would be considered separate 
ideologies because athletic issues (e.g., 
steroid use in college athletics) and 
international issues (e.g., war on terrorism) 
are not typically interrelated. It was 
hypothesized that attitudes of low need for 
cognition individuals would polarize about 
attitude related issues they did not specifically 
consider. It was also hypothesized that 
attitudes of high need for cognition 
individuals would depolarize about attitude 
related issues they did not specifically 
consider. However, there was no empirical 
support in this study for low need for 
cognition people’s attitude polarization for 
related issues they did not specifically 
consider. Similarly, there was no empirical 
support in this study for high need for 
cognition people’s attitude depolarization for 
related issues they did not specifically 
consider.  
There was, however, an unexpected 
effect for issue type (i.e., international vs. 
athletic issues). Although people did not 
specifically think about athletic issues, people 
generally experienced more attitude 
polarization about athletic issues than they did 
about international issues. There was also an 
effect for time of assessment. Overall, people 
experienced more attitude polarization post-
thought than they did pre-thought for both 
issues.  
 
Why did people’s attitudes not polarize? 
One possible explanation for a lack of 
attitude polarization is a problem with 
opportunity for thought manipulation. In this 
study, participants received an opportunity to 
think for either 30 or 90 seconds. Recall that 
amount of opportunity for thought is related 
to the extent of people’s attitude polarization. 
Perhaps participants needed more than 30 or 
90 seconds to fully consider international 
issues. However, opportunity for thought was 
likely not a problem in the current study. 
Other researchers used similar amounts of 
opportunity for thought and replicated the 
self-generated attitude change process (e.g., 
Leone & Ensley, 1986; Tesser & Conlee, 
1975). 
Another possible explanation for a 
lack of attitude polarization is participants not 
receiving enough time to express their 
attitudes. Other researchers found that the 
more opportunity people have to express their 
attitudes, the more people’s attitudes tend to 
polarize (e.g., Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 
1992; Judd & Brauer, 1995). However, lack 
of opportunity for expression was likely not a 
problem in the current study. Participants 
received more opportunity to express attitudes 
about international issues than they did about 
athletic issues, and yet participant attitudes 
polarized about athletic issues while not 
polarizing about international issues. 
Participants’ completion of the Need 
for Cognition Scale could also be related to 
their attitude polarization. In this study, 
participants completed the 18-item Need for 
Cognition Scale to measure individual 
differences in the tendency to seek out and 
enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo 
et al., 1984). Participants’ completion of the 
Need for Cognition Scale was not, however, 
likely to be related to their attitude 
polarization because participants completed 
the questionnaire after they completed all 
thought activity. Additionally, other 
researchers assessed people’s need for 
cognition along with measuring people’s 
attitude polarization and obtained the results 
they expected (e.g., Leone, 1994; Leone & 
Ensley, 1986; but see also Lassiter, Apple, & 
Slaw, 1996; Lassiter & Apple, 1998). 
Another possible explanation for a 
lack of participant’s attitude polarization 
specific to international issues is that 
participants did not feel that international 
issues were important to them. If people feel 
that an issue is important to them, they are 
often involved, active, and informed about 
that issue (e.g., Harton & Latane, 1997; 
Kaysen & Stake, 2001). If people do not feel 
that an issue is important to them, they are 
uninvolved, inactive, and uninformed (e.g., 
Harton & Latane,1997; Kaysen & Stake, 
2001). Involved and active people are more 
likely than uninvolved and inactive people to 
have polarized attitudes (e.g., Liberman & 
Chaiken, 1996; Liu & Latane, 1998; Plous, 
1991; Smith, 1989). Additionally, informed 
people are more likely than uninformed 
people have polarized attitudes (e.g., 
Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). 
Participants in this study may have felt 
involved, active, and informed about athletic 
issues and uninvolved, inactive, and 
uninformed about international issues. 
Consistent with this reasoning, paticipants’ 
attitudes about athletic issues became more 
polarized than did their attitudes about 
international issues. 
If people feel uninvolved, inactive, 
and uninformed about international issues, 
people will likely lack a well-developed 
schema. Therefore, another possible 
explanation for people’s attitudes not 
polarizing in the current study is a lack of 
people’s schemas about international issues. 
People’s attitudes often depend on their 
knowledge about a person, object, event, or 
issue (McGuire, 1985). In order for people’s 
attitudes to polarize, people must have a 
developed schema about the person, object, 
event, or issue in consideration (e.g., Leone & 
Ensley, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986; 
O’Keefe & Brady, 1980). During thought, 
people use their schemas to make their 
information evaluatively consistent (e.g., 
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Liberman & 
Chaiken, 1991; O’Keefe & Brady, 1980). 
Recall that when people use schemas during 
thought, people find it easier than when not 
using schemas during thought to focus on 
relevant stimuli (e.g., Tesser & Danheiser, 
1978), recall relevant information (e.g., Clary, 
Tesser, & Downing, 1978; Tesser & Cowan, 
1975), infer absent information (e.g., Leone & 
Ensley, 1985), interpret relevant information 
(e.g., Tesser & Cowan, 1977), and discount 
questionable information (e.g., Leshowitz, 
DiCerbo, & Okun, 2002; Lord et al., 1979; 
Plous, 1991).  
People use their well-developed schemas 
about an issue to focus on relevant stimuli. If 
people lack a well-developed schema about 
international issues when thinking about a 
specific international issue, people will not be 
able to focus on relevant information. If, for 
example, people think about suicide bombers 
in Israel and they cannot focus on relevant 
stimuli (e.g., information about Israel or 
suicide bombers), then people’s attitudes will 
likely not polarize. 
People use their well-developed 
schemas about an issue to recall relevant 
information about an issue. If people lack a 
well-developed schema about international 
issues when thinking about a specific 
international issue, people will not be able to 
recall relevant information about an 
international issue. If, for example, people 
think about suicide bombers in Israel and they 
cannot recall relevant information (e.g., 
physical characteristics of a suicide bomber), 
people’s attitudes will likely not polarize. 
People use their well-developed schemas 
about an issue to infer absent information 
about that issue. If people lack a well-
developed schema about international issues 
when thinking about a specific international 
issue, people will not be able fill in any 
missing information in their beliefs about an 
international issue. If, for example, people 
think about suicide bombers in Israel and they 
cannot infer absent information (e.g., 
ethnicity of a suicide bomber), people’s 
attitudes will likely not polarize. 
People use their well-developed schemas 
about an issue to interpret relevant 
information about that issue. If people lack a 
well-developed schema about international 
issues when thinking about a specific 
international issue, people will not be able 
determine how the new information relates to 
their schema. If, for example, people think 
about suicide bombers in Israel and people 
cannot determine the relevance of the 
information to their established beliefs (e.g., 
people see Arabs exhibiting positive 
characteristics when people believe that Arabs 
lack positive characteristics), people’s 
attitudes will likely not polarize. 
People use their well-developed schemas 
about an issue to discount questionable 
information about that issue. If people lack a 
well-developed schema about international 
issues when thinking about a specific 
international issue, people will ignore 
questionable information. If, for example, 
people think about suicide bombers in Israel 
and people cannot determine and thus 
discount new information that is questionable 
(e.g., a Catholic rather than a Muslim 
commits a suicide bombing), people’s 
attitudes will likely not polarize. 
Although people did not experience 
overall attitude polarization about 
international issues, people did experience 
overall attitude polarization about athletic 
issues. Because people’s attitudes polarized 
about athletic issues, people likely possessed 
a well-developed schema about athletic 
issues. Because people’s attitudes did not 
polarize about international issues, people 
likely lacked a well-developed schema about 
international issues. 
An additional possible explanation for 
a lack of people’s attitude polarization is a 
problem with methodology. Participants 
completed this study in several steps. First, 
participants expressed their attitudes about all 
issues, then participants thought about four 
specific issues, and finally participants 
expressed their attitudes about all issues. A 
primary difference between previous studies 
and this study, however, is the measurement 
of ideologies (cf. Leone, 1989; Leone & 
Ensley, 1986). To test people’s ideologies, 
people expressed their attitudes about two 
types of issues (i.e., international and athletic) 
rather than only one type of issue as in 
previous studies. The addition of a second 
type of issue, however, likely did not affect 
the results because people experienced more 
attitude polarization about the second type of 
issue (i.e., athletic issue) than they 
experienced about the first type of issue (i.e., 
international issue).  
Another possible issue with 
methodology is participants only reported 
their attitudes. That is, participant attitudes 
were not directly assessed. Self-reported 
measures may not be as valid in assessing 
participant attitudes as other evaluation 
methods such as direct assessment (e.g., 
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993; 
McHoskey, 1995). Therefore, any participant 
self-reported attitude polarization may not 
generalize to participant’s actual attitudes 
(e.g., Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Miller et al., 1993). 
Perhaps participant attitudes did polarize but 
participants did not perceive or could not 
verbally express this change. However, this 
was likely not the situation because other 
researchers used a similar method of 
assessment and found that participant 
attitudes did polarize (e.g., Leone, 1994; 
1996; Leone & Ensley, 1986) 
 
Unexpected Findings 
There was, however, an unexpected 
interaction between opportunity for thought 
and need for cognition for issue-specific 
attitude polarization. Individuals low in need 
for cognition experienced more attitude 
polarization given a low opportunity for 
thought than did individuals low in need for 
cognition given a high opportunity for 
thought. Individuals high in need for 
cognition experienced more attitude 
polarization given a high opportunity for 
thought than did individuals high in need for 
cognition given a low opportunity for thought. 
That is, low need for cognition individuals’ 
attitudes polarized given a low opportunity 
for thought while high need for cognition 
individuals’ attitudes polarized given a high 
opportunity for thought. 
Other researchers did find a 
relationship between people’s attitude 
polarization and people’s need for cognition 
(Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986). That 
is, several researchers found that low need for 
cognition individual’s attitudes polarized 
more given a high opportunity for thought 
than given a low opportunity for thought. 
High need for cognition individual’s attitudes, 
however, depolarized given a high 
opportunity for thought than given a low 
opportunity for thought. Conversely, Lassiter, 
Apple, and Slaw (1996; see also Lassiter & 
Apple, 1998) found that when participants 
were not prompted to explicitly think about 
their attitudes about a particular issue, high 
need for cognition individual’s attitudes 
polarized more than did low need for 
cognition individual’s attitudes. When 
participated were prompted explicitly to think 
about their attitudes about a particular issue, 
low need for cognition individual’s attitudes 
polarized more than did high need for 
cognition individual’s attitudes. That is, when 
participants were prompted to think about 
their attitudes, Lassiter et al. (1996) replicated 
the findings of Leone and Ensley (1986). 
 The Leone and Ensley (1986) and 
Lassiter et al. (1996) studies do have several 
methodological differences. First, Leone and 
Ensley (1986) had a female participant 
individually interview each participant 
whereas Lassiter et al. (1996) used a 
computer to interview each participant. 
Although an experimenter did monitor 
participants in the Lassiter et al. (1996) study, 
participants may not feel the same need to 
comply as they would during an individual 
interview. In other computer interview studies 
where participants received an opportunity to 
list their attitudes or believed they would 
discuss their attitudes with others, 
participant’s attitudes did polarize (e.g., 
Harton & Latane, 1996; Liu & Latane, 1998). 
This methodological inconsistency may be the 
reason for the different results found by 
Leone and Ensley (1986) and by Lassiter et 
al. (1996).  
Second, Leone and Ensley (1986) 
provided participants with the Need for 
Cognition Scale after participants received an 
opportunity to express their attitudes. Lassiter 
et al. (1996), however, provided participants 
with the Need for Cognition Scale before 
participants received an opportunity to 
express their attitudes. Providing participants 
with the Need for Cognition Scale before they 
received an opportunity to express their 
attitudes may have “primed” participants. 
Participants are primed when something a 
participant reads, does, or watches helps them 
recall a particular attitude or feeling (Smith, 
1998). When participants recall one attitude 
or feeling, they may recall another related 
attitude or feeling (e.g., Raghubir & Johar, 
1997). That is, participants may experience a 
spreading activation of attitudes or feelings 
(e.g., Judd, Downing, Drake, & Krosnick, 
1991; Raghubir & Johar, 1997). When people 
are primed for a particular attitude or feeling, 
their behavior tends to reflect this primed 
attitude or feeling (e.g., Berkowitz & Alioto, 
1973; Bushman & Anderson, 2002). A 
participant, for example, may be asked to 
watch an athletic event. A participant may be 
lead to believe that the athletic event is 
aggressive or non-aggressive. After viewing 
the event, participants lead to believe the 
event was aggressive behave more 
aggressively than do participants lead to 
believe the event was non-aggressive (e.g., 
Berkowitz and Alioto, 1973; Bushman & 
Anderson, 2002).  
Because Lassiter et al. (1996) may 
have primed their participants, they may have 
produced atypical results. That is, when 
Lassiter et al. (1996) presented participants 
with the Need for Cognition Scale before 
participants expressed their attitudes, both 
high and low need for cognition individuals 
though about themselves. Having this thought 
opportunity lead to participants making their 
self-concept salient and readily accessible for 
the next phase of the study. However, 
participants’ self-concept and their responses 
may be affected by their need for cognition. 
High need for cognition individuals enjoy 
fully analyzing and considering all sides of an 
issue (Cacioppo et al., 1996). These 
individuals may believe that because high 
need for cognition individuals thoroughly 
analyze an issue, they hold strong beliefs. 
Low need for cognition individuals only 
analyze and consider all sides of an issue 
when they must (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
These individuals may believe that because 
low need for cognition individuals do not 
thoroughly analyze an issue, they hold weak 
beliefs. If the above reasoning is correct, then, 
once primed, high need for cognition 
individuals would express more attenuated 
views than would low need for cognition 
individuals. But, both high and low need for 
cognition individuals would express such 
views only to be consistent with the primed 
self-concept and not necessarily with how 
they may generally process information. 
 Additionally, a detailed discussion of 
the Need for Cognition Scale in 
undergraduate social psychology courses as 
well as social psychology textbooks is 
progressively becoming a common practice. 
Because researchers find the Need for 
Cognition Scale to be reliable (e.g., Cacioppo 
et al., 1984; Sadowski, 1993; Sadowski & 
Gulgoz, 1992) and scores on the measure 
have discriminant validity (e.g., Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; Petty & Jarvis, 1996), professors 
often use this scale to engage their students. 
Professors request for students to complete 
the scale and then professors proceed to 
describe characteristics of low need for 
cognition individuals as well as high need for 
cognition individuals to their students. 
Through exposing students to the scale and 
describing the scale, professors may prime 
students with respect to the students’ need for 
cognition.  
 When students participate in studies, 
students may believe they know whether they 
are high or low in need for cognition. 
Consciously or unconsciously, participants 
may respond to statements in accordance to 
their belief. If, for example, students believe 
they are low in need for cognition, they may 
not even attempt to think about a particular 
statement. If, however, students believe they 
are high in need for cognition, they may 
attempt to think about a particular statement. 
That is, students may act in a manner 
consistent with their perceived level of 
cognition rather than with their actual level of 
cognition. Future research on self-generated 
attitude change should consider the affects of 
priming on need for cognition as related to 
self-generated attitude change. 
 
Summary 
 Although the results of the current 
research were not as expected, researchers 
should continue to study the phenomenon of 
self-generated attitude because of its real 
world applications. Self-generated attitude 
change can particularly be seen in people’s 
attitudes after September 11th. As people 
thought about the attack on the United States 
and considered the Muslim attackers, people 
became more extreme in their views of all 
Muslims (Associated Press, 2005). People’s 
extreme attitudes about Muslims may have 
eventually lead people to support the ousting 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the 
imprisonment of ‘enemy combatants’ in 
Guantanamo Bay (Jensen, 2002). 
 Psychologists can also use self-
generated attitude change in practical 
applications such as reduction of fear (e.g., 
Leone & Aronow, 1992; Leone & Baldwin, 
1983), phobias (e.g., Leone, 1984; Leone et 
al., 1983; Rothbaum, Hodges, Kooper, 
Opdyke, Williford, & North, 1995), and 
prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Hall, Varca, & 
Fisher, 1985; Munro & Ditto, 1997). These 
three phenomenon may involve the same 
process. As people think, they become more 
afraid, more phobic, or more prejudicial. By 
understanding the self-generated attitude 
change phenomenon, psychologists can 
identify ways to help people reduce their 
fears, help people confront their phobias, and 
help people control their prejudicial attitudes.  
People can also use self-generated 
attitude change in business, political fields, 
and college campuses. In understanding self-
generated attitude change, marketing 
managers may better understand consumer 
purchase satisfaction (Smith, 1989) as well as 
how people react to advertising and movies 
(e.g., Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 
1990; Malamuth, 1981), political strategists 
may better understand how people react to 
political arguments (e.g., Munro, Ditto, 
Lockhart, Fagerlin, Gready, & Peterson, 
2002), and university administrators may 
understand how students handle controversial 
issues (e.g., Rohde, 1974). Attorneys may 
also use self-generated attitude change as well 
as need for cognition in jury selection. 
Prosecutors, for example, may seek out high 
need for cognition jurors because these jurors 
may be better able than are low need for 
cognition jurors to scrutinize a case. In sum, 
self-generated attitude change is a 
phenomenon that may be related to all 
professions (e.g., psychology, marketing, law) 
and thus must continue to be studied. 
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